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Correcting Mismatched Authorities:
Erecting a New "Water Federalism'
Robert H. "Bo" Abrams

A

s the United States emerged from the colonial
period, the several states, as confederated independent sovereigns and then as constituent states in
the newly formed nation, succeeded the English
.Crown in many of the essential attributes of sovereignty. This
fact was emphasized in 1791, when the last of the original ten
constitutional amendments expressly confirmed that cession
of enumerated power by the states to the national government was not intended to relinquish the states' residual role as
what can be called "police power sovereigns." The traditional
police power comprehends the ability to legislate and regulate
to promote health, safety, and welfare. Resource management,
particularly water resource management, is well within the
ambit of that power. Accordingly, in the United States water
law is a subset of property law that controls the use and allocation of the water resource. Water law was, and remains, state
law; nothing in the Constitution purports to change that.
This structural relationship in the governance of water resources is deeply ingrained in American jurisprudence, although
in much of the West the path taken was not entirely anticipated.
For the Framers, a federal role in water policy was limited to
the interstate and international commerciaLinterest in navigation. The scope of federal sovereignty at the time of nationhood
did not include even the possibility of playing a major role in
regulating resources because the national government was not
a significant landholder. With the Louisiana Purchase in 1803,
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, and Seward's lee Box,
however, the federal government became the owner of more than
half of the nation's land. Suddenly, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2, the Property Clause granting Congress the authority to "make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States," held profound possibilities for
the federalization of water resource management because so much
of the nation's water was found on or originated on federal land.

The Ebb and Flow of Water Federalism
Throughout the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, Supreme Court decisions carefully preserved state
power over water law and water resources. Most centrally, the
so-called "Equal Footing Doctrine" held that the later-created
states had the same degree of sovereignty and rights to control
their natural resources as did the original states. See, e.g., PoUard
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v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1945). Similarly, Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois, 146 US. 387 (1892), cemented the states' sovereign role as water resource trustee for the benefit of the public,
a sovereign role held before nationhood by the English Crown.
Finally,completing the circle that ascribed power over water
resources to the states, the Court found that Congress had left
the field of water law on the vast expanse of federal land to the
states. The Court found that by express and implied acquiescence
the federal land disposition programs; including the Desert Lands
Act of 1877, effected a "severance" of federal land and the waters
found on them. Federal land patentees were required to look to
state law as the source of their water rights. See California Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 US. 142 (1935).
In this way, the nineteenth century came to a close with
the states clearly established as the masters of water law and
thereby water allocation. The only significant role for the national government in the water resource area was the work of
the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) supporting navigational
improvements along the nation's rivers and in its harbors. In
that era, with the possible exception of the unique circumstances surrounding the Corps' approval of the Chicago Diversion, those projects had no discernible impact on or conflict
. with state water policy and state law water users.
Despite the heritage of state control of water rights and
water allocation, in the twentieth century increasing federalization and the physical transformation of river systems by
modem dams and technologies changed the playing field.
Even a cursory glance at the contemporary physical landscape
of water allocation challenges the proposition that the states
are still the ones controlling the allocation of water. Almost
all of the larger dams in the nation that control the flow of
rivers are either federal facilities operated by the Corps or the
Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) or run by power-generating
entities subject to extensive operational regulation by the
, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
Assaying the legal landscape is more complex. For the BoR
and FERC (originally created as the Federal Power Commission), Congress in 1902 and 1920, respectively, recognized the
historic role of the states in determining water law and water allocation and built the foundation for what can be called "Water
Federalism." Both laws, in essence, required that water rights
be obtained under state law. See § 8 of the Reclamation Act of
1902 (now codified at 43 US.c.A. §§ 372, 383), and § 27 of
the Federal Power Act of 1920 (now codified at 16 U.S.c.A.
§ 821). The' federal judiciary, in its decisions, however, initially
construed the respect for state law provisions narrowly, lest they
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frustrate the federal interests being pursued under the commerce
power. See, e.g., Ivanhoe I'IT. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275
(1958) (reclamation), First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op v. Federal
PowerComm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (hydropower).
More recent cases have weakened the federal hegemony
in the reclamation context but essentially affirmed it in the
FERC context. Compare California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645 (1978) (reclamation) with California v. FERC (Rock
Creek), 495 u.s 490 (1990) (hydropower)." With the Corps,
as exemplified by the mainstem Missouri River and Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) litigation, the disregard of
state water law is even more striking. State water law is totally
eclipsed and has no role whatever in the de facto physical
water allocation affected by the Corps' dam operations.
On the Missouri, the Corps operates six major dams located
in Montana, South Dakota, and Nebraska, having the capacity
to store 75 million acre feet of water. (For nonwater specialists,
that capacity is five to six times the annual flow of the Colorado
River.) The Corps also maintains a 730-mile navigation channel that is nine feet deep and 300 feet wide from below the most
downstream of those dams to the Missouri's confluence with the
Mississippi River at St. Louis. Growing out of the Pick-Sloan Plan
compromise, the BaR has concurrent authority over use of the
basin's stored water for irrigation. That BaR role notwithstanding, the Supreme Court held that the principal purpose of the
mainstem dams was for navigation and flood control and that the
Corps, and not BaR and the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior, could control use of the mainstem water. See ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495 (1988). The dams are operated in a coordinated fashion pursuant to a Master Manual that
the Corps adopts and revises at infrequent intervals. Revisions to
the manual are made per typical administrative procedures.

Fighting over Federal Authorizations,
Not State Water Allocations
Increasingly, the upstream states have become dissatisfied
with the way in which the Corps operates the dams. Finding
that the principal contemporary water-related benefit of the
dams to them was derived from recreational fishery, those states
protested Corps releases of water to support do'wnstream navigation in a series of drought years. The downstream states, who
felt favored by the manual's provisions, supported the Corps.
A paroxysm of litigation followed. The basin states, and later
environmental groups invoking the Endangered Species Act,
concurrently sued the Corps in federal courts in their respective states and in the District of Colombia. A series of injunctions were obtained, ordering the Corps to take contradictory
actions, which eventually led to a single multidistrict resolution
of the dispute in which the Corps was, in the main, victorious.
Although the Corps was forced to issue a long-delayed revised
Master Manual, the courts upheld the decisions embodied in
that revised manual, which made only small changes from
past practice, adding steps to avoid unacceptable impacts on
endangered species and including the possibility of "navigation
precludes" in the driest of years. See In re Operation of the Mis-
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souri River System Litigation, 421 F.3d 618, 624 (8th Cir. 2005).
What is glaringly absent in all the litigation, of course, isstate
water law and state water allocation prerogatives. The entire
decision relied on the determination that in crafting the Master
Manual, the Corps, within an allowable range of discretion and
given Chevron deference, had conformed the plan to the dictates
'set by Congress sixty years previously in the Flood Control Act
of 1944 and other legislation related to the navigational channel.
For a thorough examination of the Missouri River litigation, see
John R. Seeronen,Judicial Challenges to the Missouri River Mainstem Regulation, 16 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 59 (2009).
In the ACF, the story is much the same, with the added
feature of efforts by the basin states of Georgia, Alabama, and
Florida to negotiate a compromise through a failed interstate
compact. The Corps operates five dams on the Chattahoochee
River, the most upstream of which, Buford Dam, is in proper
proximity to Atlanta so that the waters of its reservoir, Lake
Lanier, are an attractive source of municipal supply water. With
the advent of burgeoning growth in the Atlanta metropolitan region, and the absence of other viable sources to expand
municipal supply, over a period of more than thirty years, the
Corps permitted Atlanta to hold increasing amounts of municipal supply water in Lake Lanier and increased releases from the
dam for withdrawal downstream by the city. The overall effect
of the Corps actions was to reallocate roughly 20 percent of the
dam's total storage capacity of one million acre feet from the
primary project purposes for which the dam was authorized and
funded to municipal use, which was described as an "incidental"
purpose of the dam (and not called upon for any part of the
funding) when the dam was authorized in 1946. The downstream effect of the operational change is made more significant
because, unlike most cities where the percentages of consumption are 10 percent or below, Atlanta's municipal water use is 30
percent consumptive, thereby reducing return flow to the river.
Reinforcing the downstream impacts of increased storage and
consumption, in the last three decades the basin has experi. enced increased drought frequency and intensity-a recipe for
the two-plus decades of water use conflict that remains ongoing.
As in the Missouri, the focal point of the ACF litigation is '
the Corps, and, also as in the Missouri, the judicial resolution
totally disregards state water planning and state water law. In the
ACF, the consolidated litigation resulted in a decision against
the Corps position granting extra water to Atlanta. In re Tri-State
Water Rights Litigation, 639 F. Supp.2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
The proposed more-or-less permanent Corps reallocation away
from the purposes announced in the 1946 authorization of the
dam was held to violate a provision of the Water Supply Act of
1958 that forbids major operational changes of Corps-operated
dams to municipal supply without congressional approval.

Reinvigorating State lVater Management:
Obstacles with Incentives
The twentieth century changed water federalism dramatically. Now, at the outset of the twenty-first century, federal
control of federal projects and programs greatly reduces
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the sphere of influence of state water law and the ability of
the states to allocate water to the uses that best serve their
respective public interests. To be sure, there is nothing unconstitutional about this result. The federalization of water
governance traces to the commerce power and the more active
programmatic role of the national government that began at
the outset of the last century and expanded massively in the
New Deal and Second World War eras: Under the dictates
of the Supremacy Clause, the federal will prevails, but that is
no guarantee that pursuit of those federal interests results in a
sound allocation of water. To the contrary, there is considerable reason to doubt that an appropriate allocation of water is
likely to occur under the current division of power, where so
much control resides with the federal government.
Consider, for a moment, the dates mentioned thus far in
relation to the' major federal programs that are controlling
the nation's largest water facilities and, thereby, the water
allocation. All of them date back fifty years or more. Those'
statutes were a product of a different water reality in terms of
economic contexts, technologies for water use, and, in most
of the nation, supply and demand, as at that time water supply
exceeded demand in most places. There is no good reason
that the compromise amalgamation of the Pick and Sloan
Plans embodied in the Flood Control Act and protecting a few
additional weeks of relatively low-value barge traffic because
it is "navigation" should be outcome determinative when the
states of the Missouri's upper basin seek to allocate the water
under their laws in ways that better serve their citizens.
The Corps may say it is being true to congressional intent,
but those Congresses could have no meaningful view about
the proper allocation among competing uses for the river's
water in extreme drought conditions sixty years hence. In the
ACF basin, the reallocation limitation of the Water Supply
Act has a similar impact: it locks in sixty-year-old allocations
unless Congress can be persuaded to act. Atlanta's water may
be a big enough issue to get Congress' attention, but how
many less-visible water allocation problems brought about by
other half-century-old pork barrel statutory authorizations for
Corps projects will reach their calendar?
In these and similar cases, the argument that the Corps is the
agent that Congress appointed and put in long-term control of
the water is hardly satisfying. If agency is the basis of the power,
then it is notable that the agent was not given directions that
address current conditions. To the extent that interstate conflicts are raised by Corps management choices, as a separation of
powers matter, the Corps is, emphatically, not the federal entity
chosen to resolve interstate conflicts over water. Likewise.from
a water planning and use perspective, the Corps is a construction-project-oriented agency that historically has shown limited
capacity for sound, long-term adaptive management of water
resources. There is simply no justification for making the Corps
the water master and several reasons to consider that allocation
of responsibility deeply flawed. Yet, at the end of the day, that
is the state of affairs in many basins. Similar arguments can be
made against giving considerable degrees of control over water
use to the BaR or PERC.
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TOremedy the anachronistic aspects of current law and the
mismatch of water planning capacity and de facto water ailocation control, the federal government could promulgate a water
\ policy, though it should be noted it has never done so before
and probably never will. Neither the federal agencies nor the
Congress want to enter so contentious a field that for centuries
has bee~ viewed as a state prerogative. On two occasions in the
last half century, in 1973 and again in 1998, the federal government has commissioned a focused study of water use planning
and alternatives. Both times the studies have reaffirmed the role
of the states and recognized a need for devolution of authority
that matches water planning to the particulars of the water supply and demand conditions at the state and local levels. Second,
even if the federal government were to take on the task, it
seems unlikely to complete it successfully.
Although I have elsewhere argued for overarching allocative priorities favoring water for population security, ecological
security, energy security, and food security in that order, how
to achieve those ends or others that the states might desire
cannot be done with a one-size-fits-all approach. The .variations are too great, including topography, economy, history,
future projections of population, and the increasing degree of
climatically induced variability in rainfall and snowpack patterns that scientists describe as the loss of stationarity.
The most obvious drawback to state empowerment is the
frequently interstate nature of the water, a flowing, common.
pool resource. What suits one state's priorities for water use
may come at the expense of a neighbor, with the most common example being consumptive use or out-of-basin transfers
in an upstream state that deprive the downstream state of its
perceived fair share of the beneficial use of the resource. In
both the Missouri and ACF examples, the contestants trying
to bend the will of the Corps to their benefit are the competing states on those interstate waterways.
As masters of their water law and in the exercise of understandable political self-interest, it is hard to imagine any universal scenario in which states with the physically superior position
will share the water fairly in time of shortage. There are some
cases, such as the factual setting of Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485
(1911), in which Justice Holmes asserted that Montana would
voluntarily extend comity and honor the claims downstream
of senior appropriators in Wyoming at the expense of Montana
users, but that is the unusual case in which the two states share
rivers that cross the border in both directions. The same is not
true, for example, in the current controversy pending in the
Supreme Court between North Carolina and South Carolina
over the Catawba River. Given the regional topography, North
Carolina is consistently upstream in all of the shared basins,
and South Carolina'asserts it has acted inequitably in diverting water to another basin in which North Carolina feels it has
greater need. Some federal role is needed where water planning
and allocations in one state have what are perceived as adverse
. spillover effects felt by another state.
The second drawback with an overall water policy that
relies heavily on state water planning and management is that
the states have not posted a very good record in those areas.
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While the de jure laws on the books in an increasing number of
states require creation of a state water plan that addresses such
topics as groundwater-surface water integration, conservation,
integrated water and growth planning, drought management,
minimum levels, and flows, the promise far exceeds the execution. Taking my home state of Florida as an example, the 1973
Water Resources Act was the most far-sighted state water law in
the nation, but the year is now 2010 and only minimal progress
has been made on setting water levels and flows in advance of
permitting uses that significantly and adversely impact the resources. Nor has Florida successfully implemented aspects ofthe .
law that could have linked residential development to adequate
water supplies or imposed stringent conservation requirements.
To the contrary, when the massive, clean, and inexpensive Floridan and Biscayne Aquifers were pumped to and beyond their
carrying capacity, and cities and developers would have to look
to "alternative sources" such as reuse, co~erved water, and desalination to fuel growth, the Florida Legislature gerrymandered the
definition of "alternative sources" to include surface water. Due
to cost differentials, that change in definition has created a race
to tap the state's surface waterways, such as the St. Johns River.
Thus, if the states are to be relied upon as planners and managers of a scarce and stressed water resource, there has to be some
assurance that they will rise to the occasion rather than succumb
to the enchantment of unfettered growth and increased water
use. An incentive that overcomes temptation is needed.
The third problem with restoring state primacy in water
planning and management is that the states lack physical
control of the waters. As has already been demonstrated, the
largest water control facilities are in federal hands or are subject to federal regulation and are being managed to effectuate
federal policies and priorities. Those management choices may
be exactly what the state would choose if its hand was on the
turbines, spillways, and pumps, but not necessarily. Building
state facilities is unthinkable ecologically and economically,
and the redundancy (other than where water is available and
vitally needed storage might be increased) would be idiotic.

The CZMA as Model
The existing regulatory taxonomy that addresses the resource
management and environmental fields frequently confronts
federalism issues. one approach, in particular, is well suited to
addressing the three problems noted here-the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA). In regard to the locus of
management, the CZMA choice was the states. Much as was
shown here in regard to the state as the locus of the police power and authority to make water law and allocate the resource,
the CZMA began with the clear understanding that land use
planning in the coastal zone was a state function. In regard to
incentives for rigorous planning, the carrots offered to the states
in the CZMA were funding to prepare plans and, more importantly, inclusion of the "consistency provision." If a state files
a plan that meets the federal planning standards, the federal
government agrees to subordinate its decisional apparatus to
the state plan by requiring that all federal actions affecting the

:\'R&E Summer 2010

coastal zone be consistent with the approved state plan. The
statutory language is as follows: "[ejach federal agency activity
within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water
use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in
a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved state management
programs." 16 U.S.c. § 1456(c)(1)(A). In the instant water
management setting, the subordination worked by a consistency
provision would be more far reaching, and therefore a stronger
incentive to planning, because it requires the federal facilities to .
be operated consistently with the state plan.

There is simply no justification
for making the Corps the water
master . . . but that is the state
of affairs in many basins.
Interstate water competition can also be mediated under
a CZMA-like structure. Initially, plan approval by the federal
government is a prerequisite to the plan taking effect and
triggering the consistency provision. An element in the plan
approval process must be addressing interstate effects. This
interstate mediation function already is a part of some federal
environmental statutes. For example, §1l0(a)(2)(D)(i) ofthe
Clean Air Act requires that EPA cannot approve a State Implementation Plan that would adversely affect a sister state's ability
to comply with its air quality requirements. In the advocated
water planning context, affected sister states could be given notice of the proposed plan together with the right to intervene in
the administrative plan approval process to challenge the plan.
As part of either the statute or its implementing rules, criteria
that announce standards of interstate fairness should be articulated. Judicial review of the application of those standards in
the administrative proceeding provides further protection that
the plan will not unfairly disadvantage sister states. The agency
chosen to administer the program can be one that is designed to
undertake review of resource management plans and, importantly, can be an agency that does not have a programmatic
interest that might bias its evaluations.
This CZMA-like proposal creates strong incentives that
may spur states in shared basins each to engage in planning for
its own use of the shared basin's water resources, creating the
possibility of two states offering conflicting plans for managing the shared resource. However, it seems possible, indeed
desirable, for the competing state plans for a shared resource to
be considered together. There would be a genuine impetus for
the states to negotiate with one another in good faith because
the federal agency holds a "hammer," the power to impose a
decision based on announced principles if the states could not
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agree on aunified management strategy. The imminent threat
of a federally imposed outcome has the additional benefit
of providing political cover for a compromise, something
that history has shown is not the first instinct of most states
involved in a "water war" with a neighbor. '
Conflicts over water allocation have,become a national
topic, rather than a regional one confined to the West. Increased water use and projections for further increased demand
are combining with the decline of stationarity to underscore
the importance of having sound water management policies
and a coherent plan for water allocation at the ready and
capable of implementation. Historically, and in an earlier era
of waterfederalism, the state police power was acknowledged
as the proper locus for making water law and policy.
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In the twentieth century, even while laws and rhetoric
respected the division of authority favoring the states, the real
power over water in most basins passed into the federal government's programmatic and regulatory control, creating a mismatch of supposed authority and actual power over water. The
federal imperatives that may have justified that shift when the
relevant laws were enacted are now half a century old and seem
out of touch with the modem reality of water management. A
new statute that employs a structure similar to that of the
CZMA will put the states back in control of the water and
concurrently use federal authority in 'a role for which it is well
suited, putting the states under pressure to make genuine
concessions to one another in the management of shared basins
and playing referee if they do not treat one another fairly. ~
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